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REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEARING ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD, HELD AT LONDON ON 14 AND 15 JULY 1992

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INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 3 of its resolution 46/79 B of 13 December 1991, the General Assembly endorsed recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee against Apartheid, 1/ thereby authorizing it to continue mobilizing international action in support of the early establishment of a democratic, non-racial South Africa, inter alia, through missions, hearings, conferences, publicity and other pertinent activities. In accordance with those provisions, the Special Committee co-sponsored the International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa and the Implementation of the National Peace Accord. The Hearing, convened by Archbishop Trevor Huddleston CR and organized by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, was held at the Inns of Court School of Law, London, on 14 and 15 July 1992.

2. The objectives of the Hearing were:

(a) To receive evidence on political violence in South Africa and the threat it poses to the democratic transformation of South Africa;

(b) To assess the initiatives that have been taken to stop the violence, in particular the National Peace Accord, and to consider the contribution that the international community can make;

(c) To alert international public opinion to the issues at stake.

I. AGENDA

3. The agenda of the Hearing was as follows:

1. Overview of political violence in South Africa.

2. Study of specific cases and trends in the violence, in particular, attacks on commuter trains, the conflict in Natal, political assassinations and the role of hostel-dwellers.

3. Review of efforts undertaken to end the violence, with particular emphasis on the National Peace Accord and the Goldstone Commission.

4. Role of the international community.

II. PARTICIPANTS

4. Some 200 participants attended the Hearing. They included South African experts on human rights, legal matters and dispute resolution, representatives of various countries and intergovernmental organizations, representatives of anti-apartheid movements as well as non-governmental and religious organizations, international legal experts, and representatives of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC).

5. A complete list of participants is contained in annex II to the present report.

III. DOCUMENTATION

6. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement compiled and provided to the participants a number of documents. In addition, participants presented documents, papers, reports and other materials that were circulated at the Hearing. The list of documents is contained in annex III to the present report.

IV. PROCEEDINGS

7. The Hearing was conducted in plenary sessions and hearing sessions. During the hearing sessions, the presentations made by experts and witnesses were followed by questions from the panel of international lawyers. The sessions focused on the following issues:

Hearing session I: Political violence in South Africa: an overview;

Hearing session II: Political violence in South Africa: case studies;

Hearing session III: Efforts to end the political violence, including the National Peace Accord and the Goldstone Commission;

Panel session: The role of the international community.

A. Opening plenary session

8. The Hearing was opened by Mr. Robert Hughes, Member of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Keynote addresses were delivered by Mr. Ibrahim A. Gambari, Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid; Reverend Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, and Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, President of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement. The addresses by Mr. Gambari and Mr. Chikane are reproduced in annex I to the present report.

9. Archbishop Huddleston said that he had recently attended the funeral of the victims of the Boipatong massacre, which had profoundly affected him. He stated that Christians had a duty to convey a message of hate for evil and for one of its most perfect expressions, namely apartheid. The South African Government was responsible in law for justice and peace in the country. He expressed the hope that, after the presentation of evidence to the Hearing, a message would be sent to the United Nations Security Council. The upcoming meeting of the Security Council on the question of South Africa would be very significant, and would represent a challenge to the international community to take positive action. Participants in the Hearing therefore had a duty to

persuade the international community that apartheid was still in place and that little had changed in South Africa.

10. The formal opening was followed by a plenary session during which several speakers presented their perspectives on political violence in South Africa and the threat that it posed to the democratic transformation of South Africa. Statements were made by Mr. Sydney Mufamadi, member of the National Executive Committee of ANC and Mr. Benny Alexander, Secretary General of PAC (see annex I). The session was also addressed by Major-General Holomisa, Chairman of the Military Council of the Transkei. He stated that South Africans had a responsibility to convey to all members of the international community the gravity of the crisis in the country. He accused the South African Government of waging a "low-intensity war" and of pursuing the same strategy of terrorism and destabilization as its predecessor, and pointed out that most military and security officers suspected of wrong-doing were still in office. That "total strategy" was no longer confined to the elimination of political activists but was aimed at the entire Black community and was intended to instil fear and despair. The commissions of inquiry set up by the Government had to be replaced by independent commissions headed by reputable international jurists. The Transkei authorities had not signed the National Peace Accord because it was flawed and needed to be revamped.

B. Hearing sessions

11. During the first hearing session, panelists provided participants with an overview of the political violence in South Africa, analysing the character and nature of the violence that had engulfed the country since July 1990. Over the period of two years since that date, there had been more than 6,200 politically related deaths. The violence, which had spread outside Natal at the time of the launching of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), appeared to fluctuate in correlation with the political calendar.

12. Vigilantes had been responsible for 80 per cent of the deaths. While violence had occurred in Natal since 1984, 60 per cent of the deaths which had taken place during the last two years had been in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal area. There had been 49 major massacres since July 1990, in which 1,250 persons had been killed. In many cases, the massacres had originated from hostels. Most victims were ordinary residents of the townships, such as train commuters, while of those perpetrators who had been identified, a great majority were linked to IFP.

13. The security forces had been involved in a number of incidents, which had led to some 350 deaths. They had failed to provide basic protection to township residents. There had also been numerous reports of police collusion with perpetrators of violence, and the authorities had responded very slowly to compelling evidence of unlawful action by members of the security forces, whose bias in favour of IFP had been documented at length. The attitude of the authorities could, at best, be characterized as one of "gross negligence", which had reinforced the sense of impunity prevailing among the security

forces and the distrust in which the latter were held by township residents. There was a lack of political will to deal with the issue, and no action had been taken following the findings of judiciary investigations conducted since 1990. There was also a discrepancy between the pronouncements of high-ranking officials and the unchanged attitudes of policemen and the military on the ground.

14. The second hearing session focused on specific aspects of the violence, namely the role played by hostel-dwellers, attacks on commuter trains, the conflict in Natal and political assassinations. Participants presented evidence on the role of hostel-dwellers and stressed the need to understand fully the complex mechanisms of violence and to stop applying stereotypes or resorting to simplistic explanations. The confrontation between hostel-dwellers and residents of the townships, which had to be analysed in the context of the changing sociology of South African urban areas, was a very complex one, which had propelled previously marginalized communities into the heart of political life. Hostel-dwellers were not all victims or murderers. Two important factors that had led to their involvement in violence were their isolation and alienation from urban communities as well as their rural orientation. There were also broader factors at play such as the ongoing political process, union activities and the abolition of influx-control. There would be no simple solution to those problems. The links existing between police and hostel-dwellers, and in particular the unwillingness of the police to investigate the role of hostels in the violence, should also be noted. A resident of Boipatong presented his testimony on the events of 17 and 20 July 1992 in that township.

15. Attacks on commuter trains, which had started in July 1990, had resulted in more than 200 deaths. The Goldstone Commission had established a committee to look into the attacks. From the evidence presented to the committee, a clear pattern appeared in the nature and execution of the attacks. They were always carried out in the vicinity of hostels by large groups of armed men, during peak hours but not during holiday periods. The attackers, when identified, had been hostel-dwellers. The police had not taken prompt and significant action to stop the attacks, and very few arrests had been made. A witness, who had been attacked and abducted from a train by hostel-dwellers, testified during the session.

16. It was stressed that the conflict in Natal was an orchestrated conflict, not based on ethnic rivalry. The first regional dispute resolution committee had been set up in Natal, but its task was enormous and its resources few. There was little cooperation from the police and the judicial system to implement the National Peace Accord in that province.

17. A former member of the Civil Cooperation Bureau, Mr. Dirk Coetzee, presented his testimony on political assassinations and hit-squads. He stated that hit-squads, created by the South African authorities in the 1970s, were still active. In fact, their activities had increased over the past few years. Most of their victims had been affiliated with ANC, PAC or the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Several assassination attempts had been carried out against Mr. Coetzee himself, who had become a member of ANC.

18. The third hearing session focused on efforts to end the political violence, and particularly on the National Peace Accord and the Goldstone Commission. Participants underlined that, while those efforts were commendable, a severe lack of resources had prevented them from having an effective impact. It was important that the Goldstone Commission be granted the means to create a unit of independent investigators instead of having to rely, as it did until now, on police investigators. A witness protection programme should also be established, as witnesses were reluctant to come forward, for fear of reprisals. The Commission had made some valuable recommendations, but many of them, such as the total ban on the carrying of dangerous weapons and the fencing of hostels, had not been implemented. In some cases, the Commission's findings had lacked specificity and their ambiguity had allowed the Government to interpret them to its advantage.

19. Similarly, a lack of enforcement tools and of basic resources prevented the National Peace Accord from being effective. There had been too little publicity and information on the Accord, and the police did not cooperate towards its implementation. Therefore, there was a need to develop new monitoring mechanisms, whether entirely national or with international components.

20. The next panel session dealt with the role that the international community could play in helping to end the violence in South Africa. Speakers expressed concern at the demobilizing effect which the changes that had taken place so far in South Africa had had on the international community. Those changes had generated a premature euphoria, which in turn had led to a slackening in the previous activities aimed at facilitating the eradication of apartheid. The Boipatong massacre, however, had had a sobering effect on the international community, which had come to realize that much remained to be done. The international community, whether at the level of intergovernmental organizations or of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), had a duty to continue disseminating information on apartheid and exerting pressure on the South African authorities, while promoting the negotiating process as the surest avenue to a peaceful, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

21. Governments had to be reminded that they should not resume normal relations with South Africa until an interim government was in place. In the meantime, NGOs would continue to run campaigns to put pressure on their respective Governments in that regard and to convince them to denounce the role of the South African authorities in the violence. They would also endeavour to change existing misconceptions about "Black-on-Black violence".

22. The changing system of international relations and the new emphasis placed on the Security Council as an instrument of peace represented an opportunity for the international community, and the United Nations in particular to devise new ways to assist the political process. Many speakers expressed the hope that the Security Council would decide on a meaningful involvement of the United Nations in the monitoring of the violence in South Africa, cautioning however that that new role should be very carefully conceived and accurately defined.

C. Closing session

23. At the closing session, Archbishop Trevor Huddleston and Reverend Frank Chikane thanked the organizers of the Hearing and the participants. They expressed the hope that they had conveyed to the international community the seriousness of the situation in South Africa and the urgency of acting to eradicate apartheid completely.
Archbishop Huddleston then read out the following concluding statement, which stands in his name: 2/

"This International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa has taken place at a most decisive moment in history - we are at a turning-point in the efforts of the people of South Africa and the international community to transform South Africa from an apartheid State to a democratic and non-racial society.

"...

"The International Hearing has served as a unique opportunity for the international community to learn the truth about political violence from a diverse range of experts and witnesses from South Africa as well as from written memoranda, reports and other documentation.

"There is a common understanding that the root cause of the violence in South Africa is the system of apartheid and that it will only be the creation of a new united, non-racial and democratic South Africa that will ensure a climate in which peace can flourish and the culture of violence can be destroyed.

"It is self-evident that political violence has now reached such levels that it seriously threatens the prospects for the democratic transformation of South Africa. It has led to the breakdown of the negotiating process taking place through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa and is of such a character that it would certainly prevent democratic elections taking place in many parts of South Africa.

"The International Hearing provided an opportunity to identify the key issues which need to be addressed so that a climate can be created in which bona fide negotiations can take place as envisaged in the United Nations Declaration on South Africa. The most important of these issues are:

"(a) The continued programme of covert operations being undertaken by the South African regime;

"(b) The existence of special units, including foreign forces, such as Koevoet and Battalion 32, which are directly linked to the promotion and instigation of violence;

"(c) The lack of confidence by the Black majority in the police and security forces which are perceived as an instrument of repression against those seeking democratic change;

"(d) The failure to investigate thoroughly acts of political violence and to bring prosecutions against those involved including the failure to provide protection of witnesses;

"(e) The cover-up of cases in which members of the security forces are involved in instigating and fomenting political violence;

"(f) The transformation of many single-sex hostels into bases from which attacks are carried out;

"(g) The failure to introduce effective controls to ban the carrying of dangerous weapons and the refusal by the police to implement existing controls.

"The primary responsibility for the political violence must rest with the South African regime since it has failed to take effective measures to end it.

"The National Peace Accord and the Goldstone Commission were envisaged as mechanisms by which these issues could be addressed, yet they have been effectively subverted by the South African regime. Indeed the South African regime has ignored many of the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission.

"Evidence presented to the International Hearing confirmed that the objectives of the National Peace Accord have not been achieved and therefore special initiatives are now required, including the involvement of the international community, in order to achieve an end to political violence.

"The United Nations, together with other appropriate intergovernmental bodies including the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Community, are already seized of this issue.

"Decisive action is now required. There are three immediate and urgent challenges:

"Firstly, the international community must intervene, through the establishment of appropriate mechanisms, to ensure not only the effective monitoring of political violence which would require wide investigative and other powers, but also the means to end the violence;

"Secondly, the international community must apply the maximum possible pressure onto the South African regime so that it takes effective steps to stop the violence on the basis of the positions set out by the liberation movements as well as the religious bodies, trade unions and other democratic organizations;

"Thirdly, in order to prevent the South African regime from continuing to frustrate the process to establish a new democratic order, the international community must participate fully in the process, as provided for in the United Nations Declaration on South Africa.

"There can be no prospect of bona fide negotiations taking place as envisaged in the United Nations Declaration on South Africa unless the international community now takes such action."

Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/46/22).

2/ A/46/946-S/24291.

Annex I

A. KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY MR. IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI (NIGERIA), CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID

I wish to thank the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, under the able leadership of Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, for organizing this Hearing in cooperation with the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid. I wish also to thank you all for responding so enthusiastically to the invitation to be part of this Hearing, on what is turning out to be a very disturbing trend in the ongoing political developments in South Africa.

This Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa is taking place at a time when the political situation is unquestionably fluid. This is a moment of great anxieties and uncertainties for South Africans: a tense moment which is poised to erode the broadly acknowledged progress made so far towards a non-racial and democratic South Africa.

Political violence is not new to South Africa. One needs only look back to recall the massacres in Sharpeville, Soweto, Utinhage and Langa. To these infamous memories, we may now add Boipatong. What is disturbing about the ongoing violence, is that not only are increasing numbers of innocent citizens dying, on the average of 15 a day, but also the escalation of the violence in the face of the repeal of key apartheid legislation, in the midst of the ongoing negotiations, and most ironically against the grain of all existing principles and the code of conduct contained in the National Peace Accord of 14 September 1991.

Perhaps, what is most disturbing about the prevailing violence is the impetus and viciousness with which it is carried out. The fact that the violence has gone unchecked by the South African Government adds to the compounding of the already tense atmosphere in South Africa.

One cannot gloss over the timing and growing consistency of the political violence that is raging in South Africa. Against the moral outcry and general concern expressed globally over the deteriorating situation; against the revulsion and denunciations of Black political organizations in that country, whose members are being hacked down daily, the mindless killing of innocent citizens continues, at a time which ought to be filled with hope, anticipation and goodwill for the realization of a new South Africa.

The timing of the Boipatong massacre of 17 June, and indeed, the other wanton killings since the commencement of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) lend credence to allegations that the violence is being orchestrated and is aimed at disrupting ongoing efforts to foster a peaceful political process in South Africa. Recent reports, variously published by international organizations, such as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists, support the contention of organizations inside South Africa that documented evidence exists to show the failure by the

South African police to protect residents of townships. Such evidence also points to the involvement of some members of the police force in perpetrating acts of violence. These facts tend to confirm the existence of a sinister machination and efforts to use a "third force" to undermine progress and political stability in South Africa.

But who and what is behind the raging violence in South Africa? The United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, rightly observed in his Soweto Day statement, "violence serves no useful political end and most certainly is not conducive to peace and stability". If so, violence must be deliberately employed to serve sinister motives aimed at stultifying the goal of realizing a new and non-racial South Africa. Unfortunately, some citizens of South Africa, in allegiance to their organizations, have unwittingly allowed themselves to be exploited as tools of violence. The South African Government and its representatives on their part have been equally culpable - if not by commission, then by acts of omission.

One needs only to recall the provisions of the National Peace Accord to appreciate the various lapses of responsibility that have occurred. Chapter II of the Peace Accord established a code of conduct for political parties and organizations, which among other things stipulated that no political party or organization or any official or representative of any such party shall:

(a) Kill, injure, apply violence to, intimidate or threaten any other person in connection with that persons's political beliefs, words, writings or actions;

(b) Interfere with, obstruct or threaten, any other person or group travelling to or from or intending to attend any gathering for political purposes;

(c) Seek to compel, by force or threat of force any person to join any party or organizations, attend any meeting, make any contribution, resign from any post or office, boycott any occasion or commercial activity or withhold his or her labour or fail to perform a lawful obligation.

Certain responsibilities also devolve on the Government particularly the security forces. A few among these are worthy of recall. The National Peace Accord stipulates that:

(a) The police shall endeavour to protect the people of South Africa from all criminal acts and shall do so in a rigorously non-partisan fashion, regardless of the political belief and affiliation, race, religion, gender or ethnic origin of the perpetrators or victims of such acts;

(b) The police shall endeavour to prevent crimes and shall attempt to arrest and investigate all those reasonably suspected of committing crimes and shall take the necessary steps to facilitate the judicial process;

(c) The police shall be guided by a belief that they are accountable to society in rendering their policing services and shall therefore conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the respect and approval of the public;

(d) The police, as law enforcement officers, shall expect a higher standard of conduct from their members in the execution of their duties than they expect from others, and in pursuance hereof, supports prompt and efficient investigation and prosecution of their own members alleged to have acted unlawfully and shall commit themselves to continue the proper training and retraining of their own members in line with the objectives of professional policing and the principles set out in the Accord.

Despite these clearly enunciated responsibilities on the part of society and the Government, today we confront circumstances of violence that threaten to lead to absolute breakdown of law and order. There is also no question that many years of economic, social and political inequalities have contributed to the prevailing atmosphere of political intolerance and consequently violence. Yet such limitations must not be allowed to become grounds for exacerbating political violence.

In this context what is most disconcerting is the gross negligence of the South African authorities and the complicity of the security forces in the appalling violence. The maintenance of law and order that guarantees elementary security to all members of the society is a primary duty that no Government can abdicate. But ironically, we note, and this is well documented in the recent report of Amnesty International, that the South African Government has shirked its responsibilities in this respect. The report not only denounces the repeated failure by the South African police to respond promptly, to "calls of assistance and intervention" as stipulated in the National Peace Accord, but underlined the "enormity of the gap between the intentions and pronouncements by officials, on one hand, and the conduct on the ground of the security forces on the other". This point of view is re-echoed by the Goldstone Commission, which criticized Government's failure to take sufficiently firm steps to prevent criminal conduct by members of the security forces and punish the perpetrators.

What we confront in South Africa today is an orchestrated attempt to undermine the peaceful negotiation process, which has so far yielded tangible results. Unfortunately, Blacks in South Africa, who are predominantly the victims of this wave of violence, have unwittingly allowed themselves to become instruments of sinister forces opposed to democracy. Those who characterize the ongoing violence as "Black-on-Black violence" base their contention on the fact that the victims in every instance, just like the assailants are Black. None the less, we are painfully aware of the "hands behind the scene" - the hands of Government's agents.

Facts and figures speak volumes. Recent figures alone show that in March there were 437 deaths from political violence, in April 356, and in May 296. June figures are equally high! These lives lost in senseless killings must give us all cause for utmost concern. Estimates now put deaths from political

violence in South Africa at an average of 15 a day. These figures are unacceptable - for they constitute an outrage to the conscience of people of goodwill. Indeed, were such daily deaths attributable to a virus, the numbers alone would have been enough to warrant the declaration of a medical state of emergency to contain the viral pandemic. Why then, does it seem that the international community is indifferent to this carnage going on in South Africa, when it ought to be expressing its moral outrage?

This Hearing is propitious in that it will help us to assess the situation in South Africa and make tangible recommendations as to how to end the prevailing violence. I am cognizant that there are other measures afoot around the world to assist in this process. But these do not belie what is today the reality: that the peace process in South Africa has been stalled. Those whose goal it was to achieve this dubious objective may gloat at their seeming success - but I put it to you all, that this "victory" will be vacuous if South Africans and the international community work in concert to bring it to an end. If we must end the ongoing carnage, South Africans, both within and outside the Government must show greater commitment to peace. And all efforts must be harnessed in creating the means and the environment to curb the senseless violence raging in South Africa.

I must, however, reiterate what I said at the beginning - that the South African Government has the ultimate responsibility to ensure the security of the people and the State. There can be no question that, if it had not been willing to exploit the violence to its own political advantage, the violence would have long abated.

In closing, I wish to note, with great satisfaction, that, in response to the call by the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations Security Council will meet tomorrow to discuss the South African question. Hopefully, after the Council's meeting, an effective United Nations presence in South Africa will be agreed upon by all sides in South Africa aimed at helping to find a prompt and lasting solution to the problem of violence. We must all hope that the heightened concern by the United Nations and its possible involvement will contribute significantly to the general effort of the international community such as this important Hearing to end the violence and to resuscitate the negotiation process to end apartheid peacefully.

We must acknowledge, however, that while the international community has an obligation to assist in containing the violence in that country, South Africans themselves must show a collective resolve and good faith. More importantly, they must all abide by the covenant which they entered freely by signing the National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991.

Assuming that they have all forgotten, let me remind them that they did resolve collectively then that:

> "We the signatories accordingly solemnly bind ourselves to this Accord and shall ensure as far as humanly possible that all our members and supporters will comply with the provisions of this Accord and respect its

underlying rights and values and we, the Government signatories undertake to pursue the objectives of this Accord and seek to give effect to its provisions by way of the legislative, executive and budgeting procedures to which we have access."

Finally, I wish to emphasize that peace is indivisible and that a threat to peace anywhere should be considered as a threat to peace everywhere. Therefore, the loss of lives in the Black townships of South Africa is no less deserving of world attention as those in Sarajevo. The challenge before the international community in general and all the people of South Africa in particular is to work assiduously for the return of true and lasting peace in that country.

B. KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY THE REV. FRANK CHIKANE, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

I would like to express our thanks to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, particularly to Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, for organizing this event on political violence in South Africa with an intention of assisting to resolve this crisis. I would like to also thank the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid for sponsoring and supporting this important Hearing.

South Africa is part and parcel of the world. It is part of what is often called a global village and, as such, whatever happens there affects the international community equally. As long as one part of this globe has no peace, there will be no peace in the world. Your interest therefore in our plight in South Africa is welcome and appreciated. This event has the potential of giving our people in South Africa hope that a solution will be produced soon to end the violence. There is a lot of feeling of hopelessness of people who are victims of circumstances because of this senseless violence.

Our country has never known peace since 1652 and more so since the imposition of the apartheid system in 1948. But the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the worst violence ever. This violence is related, first, to the security force suppression of the people's resistance to the apartheid system. And lately it is part, and that is what I will share with you this morning, part of the strategy of the Government of destabilization and weakening of opposing parties in the negotiation process.

Following the 2 February 1990 announcement of the de Klerk Government to unban the liberation movements and to enter into negotiations, we warned that the violence which was escalating then formed a serious threat and obstacle to the negotiation process. Once negotiations had started in one form or another, we warned again that the violence threatened the process itself.

Between 2 February 1990 and 1 October 1991 church leaders of the South African Council of Churches met Mr. de Klerk three times. And in the these meetings preliminary evidence of allegations of security force involvement in

the violence was presented to him. We made him aware of the general loss of confidence in the security forces by the majority of South Africans.

As a result of this violence, the African National Congress (ANC) gave the Government an ultimatum to act on certain aspects of this violence before 9 May 1991, failing which there would be no talks between the Government and ANC. This crisis called on church leaders to intervene to get the negotiation process back on track. Following this intervention a broad forum of churches and business was constituted to facilitate the process which led to the National Peace Accord.

The National Peace Accord and various other factors opened the way for a possibility of a negotiated settlement in South Africa. But the violence continued to threaten this process. As a result, church leaders of the South African Council of Churches convened an emergency summit of leaders of affected areas to strategize jointly on how to end the violence. A statement in this regard was adopted leading to two follow-up working groups on matters which dealt with international monitoring and involvement of the international community and general implementation strategies on decisions of leaders. I will not bore you with the details. The three documents could be made available for your study.

In the same breath, church leaders also requested a meeting with Mr. de Klerk to impress on him once more about the seriousness and dangers of the violence and presented to him concrete proposals on how this violence can be ended. A detailed memorandum was presented to him and it has been put as part of the package for this Hearing. Unfortunately since 22 May 1992 when we met Mr. de Klerk, there has not been a response to that memorandum.

This International Hearing meets at a time when we are faced with the worst crisis ever in the country. There is a deadlock at CODESA regarding constitutional negotiations and related matters of the process of negotiations. Many would ask what the nature of the deadlock is. And I would summarize it by saying that the minority Government understandably fears democracy: that if democracy took its course they would lose power and their intention of entering into negotiation process was not to lose power but to be part of that control of power. And that is understandable when it comes to people who are in the minority. But unfortunately democracy requires that the people of the country make the choices that they would want to have. The key question that is facing South Africa today is whether the people of South Africa participate in the production of a constitution for that country, or some group that is not elected produces a constitution and imposes it on the people. And that to me is the element of the deadlock.

But we are not only faced with a deadlock, we are faced with a call for mass action to force the apartheid regime out of power or to cause it to remove all constraints to the process of transition to democracy. This has been undertaken because of the deadlock. People who are voteless and can not follow ordinary processes of elections and deciding on the future of the country resort to methods that they believe are the best at a particular given time. And this has been the method that has been resorted to.

There is also, on the other hand, and that is the third element of this crisis, a build-up since 16 June 1992 of a violent response of forces of darkness to mass action. In fact the prophets of doom want to prove and fulfil their prophecy - mass action will cause violence. And so when people undertake it, then forces of darkness come and murder people so that the world can believe that indeed it causes violence. A close examination of the violence around 16 June and the days after shows that in fact the violence came from outside people rather than people who were themselves involved.

That action by forces of darkness has resulted in the Boipatong massacre and various other incidents of brutal killings of innocent civilians in the country.

The fourth element is that all this had led to the breakdown in the negotiation process. CODESA has been put aside and there have been exchanges of memoranda and a moratorium has been declared on exchanges of memoranda as well. And so we are faced with the worst crisi ever.

To put this violence in perspective, I have chosen to deal rather with the historical sources of this violence in South Africa, focusing specifically on the role of the apartheid regime in this violence. I am doing this so that all those who will present evidence in the Hearing of specific activity and involvement of one group or another in the violence will have the context within which they present it. I have chosen rather to deal with the Government and some would ask why have I chosen to do so. There are two reasons. One is that the rest of the other complexities of the violence will be dealt with during this Hearing and I wish you all the luck in that exercise. But the second and the main reason is that, whilst church leaders are aware of the complex nature of this violence and the fact that there are other parties implicated in this regard, we believe that the South African Government is primarily responsible for the violence. Our conclusion is based on the following.

Firstly, it is the historical involvement of the South African Government in violence itself. All of us know that the regime was structured in such a way that it institutionally violated the rights of the majority of South Africans. The racist apartheid Government and the system was violently imposed on the people causing untold harm, misery and death to many of our people over many years.

To suppress the people's resistance they used naked force, including detention without trial, torture and long-term imprisonment of opponents of apartheid. This naked violence of the regime started a spiral of violence in the form of counter-violence and more violence.

It is now history that the Government considered the people's resistance as part of a total onslaught against the White minority and thus developed an elaborate strategy called "total strategy" against what was perceived as a "total onslaught" against it. This total strategy meant total war against all those opposed to the regime, both inside and outside the country. This

involved mass detentions, repressive security legislation, restrictions on the press, etc. It involved getting engaged in covert operations involving assassinations, special forces, murder squads and hit squads. And more revelations of commissions or evidence in commissions have shown that this was the way in which the Government operated. The only way the revelations take me shows beyond doubt that in fact the Government was involved at the highest level.

But this violence of apartheid has created a spirit of intolerance amongst the people of South Africa. Apartheid was intolerant and therefore people learned to be intolerant. People learned to be violent as a way of resolving their problems. Because of this intolerance and the resort to violence as a means of solving problems, we have created a culture of violence in the country. A culture of intolerance that South Africa will suffer under for a long, long time. The violence therefore as designed, was such that it would then appear in terms of covert designs and operations to be "Black-on-Black" violence, or look like it is "Black-on-Black" violence.

The revelations have made it unnecessary for me to sing the song I have been singing up to July last year. This is not just tribal violence. This is not just "Black-on-Black" violence. This is a well-designed form of violence that has political intentions. The violence in the country has taken a momentum of its own and is becoming self-perpetuating.

Whilst those who triggered it may look innocent, they are responsible for that spiral of violence we are facing. The second reason why we believe that the Government must take responsibility is the Government's failure to cap the violence. That Government was very efficient in dealing with us. I am one of those people who knew how effective they were. There was no time when we held a meeting and did not expect that they would know about it. There was no time when we planned peaceful activity, when we did not expect that they would know about it and interfere with it. They have been effective in pre-empting even peaceful protest which we tried to plan in a way they would not know. They arrested many of our people and the same effective security force has suddenly lost its capacity to deal with the type of violence we are facing in the country.

We argue that they have no intention to stop the violence and that the violence is a continuation of the covert operations which are part of security forces and therefore we have no ability, no capacity to end that violence.

The third reason is that this Government has a responsibility as a government. We believe that it is not a legitimate Government. But it is a legal authority. It has responsibility for the security forces. No one outside the Government can stop the violence except a legal authority with security forces. And unless there is an alternative peace-keeping force, or an alternative form of security force, all specialized and trained for that purpose, we are unlikely to end the violence.

The Government cannot argue for sovereignty of State and that they are the legal authority and pass the responsibility for ending violence to other people.

I would like to summarize by saying that we believe that there are other groups that are involved in violence. And the evidence will indicate in that direction. But we believe that the Government is primarily responsible and unless the Government takes responsibility to end the violence no one outside the Government can stop it. And unless we gain access to their covert operations no one will be able to stop the violence in the country.

And so the ball is right in the court of the apartheid regime and we have to make sure that all South Africans and the international community constrain the Government in South Africa, in the interim, to stop the violence until such time as interim mechanisms take responsibility for the security forces.

Secondly, I would like to submit to you, which submission I have made to our conference last week of the South African Council of Churches, that the Government has had a twofold strategy. The first part of the strategy was a strategy of destabilizing those they negotiate with, whilst negotiating with it. Saving which they would resort to what others have called "plan B". And this plan B would mean that, in the process of negotiations and giving credibility to the South African Government, entering into international relations would give the Government such an image that anybody who questioned their bona fides would lose the propaganda war. And having lost the propaganda war suppressions of those people would be justified. I would like to ask you to be vigilant as you deal with this violence during these two days.

C. STATEMENT BY MR. SYDNEY MUFAMADI, AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA

This hearing gives us the welcome opportunity to share with you our thoughts on the question of violence which has generated so much topicality inside and beyond the borders of South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) proceeds from the basic assumption that all of us gathered here today have, over a long period of time, been seized with the question of looking for ways and means by which to expedite the process of transforming South Africa into a zone of freedom, peace and social progress. We therefore take it as given that the object of this Hearing is to determine with precision the resources which need to be mobilized and deployed in order to overcome the problem of violence, a problem which has come to pose perhaps the biggest single impediment to the process of transforming South Africa into a non-racial democracy.

In his second interim report, the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, Justice Richard Goldstone, came to a determination that, and I quote: "The causes of violence are many and complicated". He elected to list them in historical sequence. Topmost on the list were "the consequences of 3 centuries of racial discrimination, and over 40 years of an extreme form of racial and economic dislocation in consequence of the policy of apartheid".

If we were all to proceed from that premise, as ANC certainly does, then the conclusion becomes inescapable that the violence we see raging in our country has everything to do with the old system's refusal to yield place to the new. One does not have to dig too deep into the archives to make the point that our people always held themselves in readiness to defy the many odds heavily laid against them, in a daring effort to liberate themselves from a system which sought to subjugate them to perpetual servitude. Having drawn a line between themselves and the regime, our people have always seen the unity of the oppressed as a sine qua non of their struggle for national liberation.

In this regard, the formation of the United Democratic Front in September 1983 was seen as watershed development. It was a development which at once gave organizational expression to the unity of our people, and gave them the greater capacity to gather their resources and energies to launch an all-out offensive against the regime. On 29 October of the same year, there were clashes between the students of the University of Zululand and supporters of Inkatha. In a speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, on the 2 November 1983, the following charge was made:

> "I know the background to the formation of the Congress of South African Students. It was formed as a front organization for the ANC's mission in exile".

Those words were not uttered by a member of the special branch. On the contrary, they came from a man who deplores violence in general, Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. The words were intended to justify the violence of Inkatha against other Blacks who he charged were "people from other parts of the country, with different ethnic origins, who do nothing about the terrible circumstances in the places they come from".

We recall these instances in order to make the point that the current wave of violence has its origins in Natal, as a reaction to the growing strength of the democratic movement. The fact that the intensity of this violence increased in direct proportion to the growing strength of the democratic movement explains its central purpose. Not only do we know that the United Worker's Union of South Africa (UWUSA) was formed by Inkatha as a counter-balance to COSATU, but also it has since come to light that the Department of Military Intelligence and the South African police saw UWUSA as an important weapon to be used against the growing tide of militancy which was in evidence in our country. The same violence, which for some time was confined to the province of Natal, was exported to the Transvaal after the unbanning of ANC and other political organizations. It has since become generalized, and all the four provinces of our country are enveloped in it. If one thing is clear, it is the fact that we are not talking here about a spontaneous conflict between political parties. Rather, we are talking, as we have said before, about violence which cannot but originate from within the system.

Following the release of our leaders and the unbanning of our movement, the world and preeminently our people glimpsed a path of negotiation to a more worthy future. When we went to Pretoria on 6 August 1990, we were not under pressure to suspend the armed struggle. Suspension of the armed struggle and activities related thereto was a policy decision we took in the interest of enhancing a climate necessary and conducive to the success of the negotiations process. The ink on the paper on which the Pretoria Minute was written had hardly dried up when the regime started to interpret related activities as meaning or including mass action. They deliberately distorted its meaning for purposes of justifying their attempt to emasculate one of our people's most important civil liberties, the entitlement to sue for a rapid process of democratization and participation.

The same charges and sentiments were expressed by the regime in 1992, and were echoed in its memorandum to the president of ANC, Comrade Nelson Mandela, after we took a decision to suspend CODESA and all bilateral contact with the regime. Today, the air is replete with allegations and counter-allegations as to who bears ultimate responsibility for the violence in our country.

Evidence which has come before the courts and various judicial and commissions of inquiry has pointed to the involvement of elements from the regime's security apparatus in the fomenting and in some cases the actual perpetration of violence. Evidence abounds to show that the security forces cannot be exonerated. In any case, they were trained to carry out acts of political violence in the belief that they were dealing with people and organizations who pose a threat to State security. This explains why we continue to see such forms of violence as assassinations of members and activists in the democratic movement. In more recent times, squatter camps have been targeted for attacks. It is precisely because of their condition of extreme deprivation that people in the squatter camps turned to be militantly in favour of democratic change. When a policeman is deployed to attend to people who have taken to the streets to demonstrate their disgust at the regime's apparent stalling of the process of democratization, he relates to that demonstration from the point of view of the political motivation that was given to him over the years. He sees the demonstration as a subversive act warranting suppression. This is the frame of mind which accounts for the violent manner in which members of the South African police have handled and continue to handle popular manifestations.

The question which arises, therefore, is whether or not Mr. de Klerk is responsible for the violence we are talking about. It is difficult for us to conceive of a situation where Mr. de Klerk would have said in a meeting, and instructed members of the security forces, to continue the campaign of internal destabilization. However, this does not alter the fact that as State President, he is obliged to ensure the protection of all the people of South Africa, including those who correctly think that his Government is illegitimate. He does not appear to have come to this particular determination, for how else can one explain the fact that his attorney generals have failed to prosecute many IFP and security force members who were identified in several instances as being criminally culpable.

In our view, if implemented, the recommendations which Justice Goldstone made when he tabled his second interim report could lead to a substantial reduction of the root causes of violence. We cannot but draw only one inference from Mr. de Klerk's apparent reluctance to heed those recommendations. His Government objectively benefits from the continuing violence.

We wish to say, in conclusion, that the continuing violence and the regime's duplicity are some of the factors which compelled ANC and its allies to break off negotiations which were taking place within the framework of CODESA. We then put forward demands which we insisted must be met as a prelude to the resumption of negotiations. Our programme of rolling mass action, which is unfolding, is a letter of invitation to the regime to negotiate in good faith. We therefore hope that this Hearing will conclude by identifying other levers of pressure to be exerted with that focus in mind, for the challenge we all face is not to stand aside. We are all called upon to contribute to the necessary pressure which demands change while there is still time to bring it about by peaceful means.

D. STATEMENT BY MR. BENNY ALEXANDER, PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA

On behalf of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed masses of Azania it represents, we wish to thank the organizers of this International Hearing whose genuine concern and efficient administration made this timely occasion possible.

The euphoria created by the seemingly wonderful reformist posturing of Mr. F. W. de Klerk has made way for sobering concerns and serious questions of his real motives by the international community. The euphoria was created by the unbanning of PAC, ANC and other organizations and the repeal of certain laws. Mr. de Klerk was judged at face value and applauded. He received red-carpet treatment wherever he went.

My submission is that Mr. de Klerk never had a change of heart from the beginning. He was forced against his will to adopt a reformist posture by the twin pressures of heightened internal resistance and the international isolation campaign which included punitive economic sanctions. In short, the reforms were not a result of democratic goodwill but because the regime had to embark on it to get itself out of isolation.

The International Hearing on violence in occupied Azania is necessary because, contrary to the belief of some Governments, the relaxation of pressures has not helped the suffering oppressed masses but played into the hands of a murderous regime. Mr. de Klerk simultaneously announced reforms and unleashed an unprecedented wave of violence: 7,000 people have died since 2 February 1990. According to a news conference held by Maj. Gen. L. C. A. Pruis on 9 July, the South African security forces expect violence to escalate over the next six months. Since 1984, 30,000 Africans in the region became the victims of the brutal racist regime.

My people are being killed on a daily basis in significant numbers. I want to stress one point, the Boipatong incident is but one in a daily catalogue of murders for political reasons perpetrated by the racist regime.

PAC is the architect of the call for international involvement to resolve the crisis in Azania. The regime continues to oppose meaningful and effective international involvement on the grounds that international involvement will be interfering in the affairs of a sovereign State or alternatively undermine the sovereignty of the State. They base their sovereignty on the relationships with various countries flowing from certain international obligations.

The naked truth is, however, that the indigenous African people of Azania were colonized and have not regained their land and national sovereignty as at the date of this meeting. So-called claims of a sovereign State under these circumstances are feeble attempts to mutilate and take the history of our country and to manipulate international law in the most scandalous and gigantic colonial fraud of the twentieth century. The only time Azania will be an independent and sovereign State will be when the vast dispossessed, indigenous African majority, whose country was colonized, regain control of their inalienable right to self-determination.

PAC and the oppressed African masses hereby repeat their invitation to the international community to send an international commission to South Africa because of the following reasons.

The violence is ongoing, inhuman, disruptive and escalating with no end in sight. I have earlier quoted a statement of only a few days ago by the security forces in which they predict an escalation of violence. They do not predict any curbing of the violence through their efforts.

The National Peace Accord has failed to define or curb the violence and cannot be relied upon to end the violence. The National Peace Committee has played all its cards and its members are sitting with their hands in their hair. It is significant that those who are implicating each other in the violence are both signatories to the Accord and agents of its implementation. These are the people who have failed. The Accord fails to define the violence and to identify its manifestations. Any structure established must be based on the definition and manifestation of the violence in order to be informed of its relevant required structural and functional orientation. The violence manifests itself primarily through highly professional, well-financed, well-armed, hired hit men who appear and disappear in seconds. The Goldstone Commission operations under the National Peace Accord functions under the spurious and fallacious assumption that ordinary people are involved in the violence and can be summonsed to account for their deeds. Hence, its ad nauseam call for Mr. de Klerk's men to be identified by name and address and to be summonsed for their deeds and, in the absence of these factors, Mr. de Klerk is not to blame for the violence. It is precisely because of these fatal structural shortcomings that PAC had no problem in predicting that the Accord would fail, and without any smugness, may I point out that only the

analysis and logical predictions of PAC have proved correct in the dynamics of violence in Azania. For this reason, I want this Hearing to listen carefully to what I have to say.

The South African regime and its agencies, which are signatories to the Peace Accord, are implicated in the violence, in part by their own operating agents, like the Black Cat gang which confessed to training to murder our people. Besides this, the regime failed to take meaningful steps to end the violence and, in a blatant attempt to undermine the possible involvement of the United Nations to end the violence, it propped up the Goldstone Commission with a few foreign faces. Besides the fact that the foreign faces in the said Commission represent an acknowledgement of the need for international involvement, their recruitment into failed and failing strategies leaves much to be desired. We have no choice but to call on the Security Council to condemn the South African Government for its involvement in the violence.

Through its numerous resolutions and declarations in support of our liberation struggle and movements, the United Nations is seized with the matter of our freedom and, due to the inhuman acts perpetrated against us, this is the most appropriate forum to assist in resolving the problem of violence in our country. The main aim of the violence is to destabilize the United Nations-recognized liberation movements and to reduce the African population numerically.

As I am speaking now, the problem is already internationalized through the involvement of foreign mercenary forces like Buffalo Battalion 32 comprising Angolan bandits and Koevoet, comprising Namibian bandits turned mercenaries. I am calling on all distinguished persons present here today to ask themselves why any Government would want to keep battalions of foreign mercenaries and spend 5 million rand for covert operations when it is not facing any foreign threat from outside and when its masses from inside are ready to address the political problems democratically through the elections of a Constituent Assembly. Foreign mercenaries internationalize the problem: the international agencies must internationalize the solution. The United Nations should supervise the disbanding and expulsion of foreign mercenaries and investigate the true nature of the violence with a view to identifying the perpetrators and, together with Azanians, work out solutions which will work. PAC is ready to collaborate fully with such a commission on the violence. The anti-apartheid movements have a role to play in this regard. The anti-apartheid movements are confused because they are sectarian and thereby add to the arrogance and intolerance and divisions in our country. No wonder that wherever I go, I find you confused on the issue of the isolation campaign and sanctions.

The lifting of sections of the isolation campaign against South Africa by sections of the international community was premature. Selective mandatory and voluntary sanctions should be strengthened and a moratorium on sports contacts should be introduced until peace and democracy have been introduced through the electoral process. PAC will continue to call on the support groups to oppose the international participation in sports of South Africa.

In many parts of our country, oppressed persons cannot prepare properly for sporting events due to danger arising from the violence. How can we play sports together on Sunday and shoot each other on Monday? There can be no normal sports in an abnormal society. Since the violence is political, its solution should have a political content. To this end, the Security Council should empower the United Nations Secretary-General to identify a neutral venue and representatives of the United Nations urgently to convene, chair, verify, supervise and mediate the discussions of and the election for a Constituent Assembly.

Annex II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

I. UNITED NATIONS

A. Special Committee against Apartheid

1. Member States

H.E. Mr. Ibrahim A. Gambari (Nigeria), Chairman

H.E. Mr. Viktor Batiouk (Ukraine), Vice-Chairman

Mr. Garaudy Laguerre (Haiti)

Mr. Abdullahi Omaki (Nigeria)

2. Observers

(a) African National Congress of South Africa

Mr. Sydney Mufamadi

Mr. Mendi Msimang

(b) Pan Africanist Congress of Azania

Mr. Benny Alexander

Mr. Dabi Khumalo

Mr. Joe Moabi

B. Other United Nations bodies and specialized agencies

Ms. A. Cassam, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Mrs. Neela Ghai, Centre for Human Rights

Mr. Julian de Wette, United Nations Information Centre, London

II. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND PARLIAMENTARIANS

A. Governments

Canada: Mr. Ian MacVay

China: Mr. Zhang

Denmark: Mr. Finn Normann Christensen

Ethiopia: Mr. Musa Elmi Ali

Guyana: Mr. Orin Alexander

India: Mr. Rinzine Wangdi

Namibia: Mr. Paul Kalenga

Netherlands: Mr. Onno Kervers

Nigeria: Mr. Adefuye

Mr. M. U. Mohammed

Norway: Mr. John Bech

Portugal: Mrs. Anna Gomez

Senegal: H.E. Mr. Sy

Trinidad and Tobago: Mr. Calvin Smith

United Republic of Tanzania: H.E. Mr. Ali Mchumo

Zambia: H.E. Mr. Love Mtesa

Mrs. M. G. B. Chigaga

B. British Parliament

Mr. Richard Caborn

Mr. Andrew Faulds

Lord Hatch

Mr. Robert Hughes

Mr. Chris Russel

C. European Parliament

Mr. Bugalho Edureso

Ms. Nadia Van Hamme

III. INDIVIDUALS

A. Special guests

Rev. Frank Chikane, General Secretary, South African Council of Churches

Mr. Dirk Coetzee

Mr. Max Coleman, Human Rights Commission of South Africa

Ms. Susan Collin, Centre for Intergroup Studies

Mr. Sipho Gabasche, Natal Regional Dispute Resolution Committee

Mr. Peter Harris, civil rights attorney coordinating presentation of evidence to the Goldstone Commission

Major General H. B. Holomisa, Chairman, Transkei Military Council

Ms. Paula McBride, Lawyers for Human Rights

Mr. Charles Mofokeng

Mr. Lebohang Motlung

Mr. Chris Orr, Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression

Mr. Tefo Raditapole, civil rights lawyer coordinating presentation of evidence on train attacks to the Goldstone Commission

Dr. Hilary Sapire

Ms. Lauren Segal, Project for the Study of Violence, University of Witwatersrand

B. Other individuals from South Africa

Mr. Gavin Cawthra

Mr. Paul Harris

Mr. Solly Kotane

Dr. Jonathan Leape

Mr. Themba Makhubo

Ms. June Masiya

Mr. Thaba Mofamane

Mr. Mathole Motshekga

Dr. Mpehle

Mr. Michael Mtuli

Ms. Alita Naughton

Ms. Thembi Nobadula

Mr. Chris van Noordwyk

Ms. Julia Scott

Mr. Mark Scott

Mr. Mahlomola Skhosana

Mr. Mark Sweet

Mr. Thobeka Thamage

Mr. Victor Thamage

Major Mbulelo Xaba

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS PANEL

Mr. Geoffrey Bindman

Mr. William Bowring

Ms. Kate Marcus

Ms. Paulette Pierson-Mathy

Mr. Geoffrey Roberston

V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Ms. Colleen Morna, Commonwealth Secretariat

Mr. Emmanuel Gasana, Organization of African Unity

VI. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENTS

A. International non-governmental organizations

1. Amnesty International

Mr. Rob Beasley

Ms. Jane Cooper

Mr. Dan Jones

Ms. Eve Mitchell

Ms. Mary Rayner

Ms. Kay Snowden

2. International Federation of Human Rights

Mr. Michael Ellman

3. International Alert

Mr. Andy Carl

Mr. Mark Curnin

4. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

Mr. Khemraze Cunniah

5. World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa

Mr. Abdul Minty

6. World Council of Churches

Rev. Barney Pityana

B. Anti-apartheid movements, religious and other organizations

Belgium

Mr. C. M. Bax, APRODEV

Mr. Alain Carrier, Comité contre le colonialisme et l'apartheid

Ms. Thérèse de Muynck, AKZA

Denmark

Ms. Lotte Lund, Sydafrika Kontact

Mr. Michel van den Heuvel, IBIS

France

Ms. Jacqueline Derens, Rencontre nationale contre l'apartheid

Mr. Pierre Derens, Rencontre nationale contre l'apartheid

Germany

Mr. Erich Beining, Terre des Hommes

Rt. Rev. Dr. Heinz Joachim Held, Evangelical Church

Ms. Ursula Merk, Medico International

Mr. Peter Schröder, Anti-Apartheid Bewegung

Greece

Ms. Eugenia Papamakariou, Greek Committee for International Democratic Solidarity

Ireland

Rev. T. P. McCaughey, Anti-Apartheid Movement

Italy

Ms. Laura Carlodalatri, Associazone Italiana contro l'Apartheid

Mr. Luca de Fraia, Associazone Italiana contro l'Apartheid

Japan

Ms. Yoshiko Inagaki, Anti-Apartheid Committee

Mr. Akira Kusuhara, Anti-Apartheid Committee

Netherlands

Mr. Jan Verhage, Interchurch Organization on Development Aid

Rev. Dr. Jan van Butselaar, Netherlands Missionary Council

Norway

Ms. Eva Hyge, Council for Southern Africa

Ms. Ellinor Kolstad, Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions

Sweden

Ms. Kerstin Bjurman-Moalosi, Africa Groups

Ms. Annika Forsberg, Isolate South Africa Committee

Ms. Birgit Jodahl, Africa Groups

Ms. Anne-Marie Kihlbergh, Africa Groups

Mr. Solomon Pelham, Africa Groups

Switzerland

Ms. Nelly Brandl, Anti-Apartheid Movement

Mr. Mathias Klemn, Anti-Apartheid Movement

Mr. Siro Petruzzella, Anti-Apartheid Movement

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Mr. Mark Adams, Southern Africa Coalition (Merseyside)

Mr. Colin Adkins, Manufacturing Science Finance

Ms. Shelagh Allen, Kairos

Ms. Florence Assie, National Peace Council

Right Rev. Simon Barrington-Ward, Southern Africa Coalition

Mr. Nigel Bellamy, National Union of Civil and Public Servants

Ms. Cindy Berman, Christian Aid

Mr. Rodney Bickerstaffe, National Union of Public Employees

Mr. P. Bond, Transport and General Workers Union

Councillor Peter Brayshaw, Mozambique/Angola Committee

Ms. Victoria Brittain, South Africa - The Imprisoned Society

Ms. Mary Brogan, National Board of Catholic Women

Mr. Butler, Amalgamated Engineering Union

Rev. David Cambell, Society of Saint John the Evangelist

Mr. Shalom Charikar, Jews Against Apartheid

Councillor Tim Collins, Avon County Council

Mr. David Craine, End Loans To South Africa

Mr. Ken Gill, Manufacturing Science Finance

Mr. Ross Grant, Christian Aid

Ms. Farzana Hakim, National Union of Students

Councillor Bill Hanley, Harlow Council

Mr. Malcom Harper, United Nations Association

Ms. Alison Harvey, Christian Fellowship Trust

Ms. Mary Hufford, National Union of Teachers

Ms. Sheila Hughes, Mozambique Information Office

Mr. Brian Hurwitz, Lawyers against Apartheid

Canon Eric James, Christian Action

Mr. Desmond John, Wolverhampton Metropolitan Borough Council

Ms. Doreen Joslin, Anti-Apartheid Movement (north-east of England)

Mr. Rashid Kareh, United Nations Association

Mr. Reg Kelly, National Communications Union

Ms. Ethel de Keyser, British Defence and Aid Fund

Mr. Steve Kibble, Catholic Institute for International Relations

Mr. Martin Kingston, Morgan Grenfell International

Ms. Glenys Kinnock, Bishop Ambrose Reeves Trust

Special Apostle Philip Kyei, Council of African and Afrocaribbean Churches

Mr. G. Laird, Amalgamated Engineering Union

Ms. Margaret Legum, Iona Community

Mr. Ian Linden, Catholic Institute for International Relations

Mr. Stephen Lloyd, CAFOD

Mr. George Lobo, Anti-Apartheid Movement Trade Union Committee

Ms. Suzanne Long, United Nations Association

Ms. Alison Mallalieu, National Westminster Bank

Mr. John McFadden, National Association of Local Government Officers

Ms. Claire McMaster, Southern Africa - The Imprisoned Society

Councillor Khan Moghal, Manchester City Council

Mr. Clive Nelson, Southern Africa - The Imprisoned Society

Mr. Ian Parkins, National Westminster Bank

Ms. Maggie Paterson, Catholic Institute for International Relations

Ms. Persad, Amalgamated Engineering Union

Rev. Arthur Phalo, Society of Saint John the Evangelist

Ms. Vella Pillay, Anti-Apartheid Movement

Mr. Jackie Reeve, CAFOD

Rev. Paul Renshaw, Council of Churches in Britain and Ireland

Councillor Nirmal Roy, London Borough of Camden

Mr. Val Rowling, Quaker Peace and Service

Mr. Tim Sanders, Anti-Apartheid Movement (Chilterns Regional Committee)

Mr. Andre Schott, City of London Anti-Apartheid Group

Mr. Paul Spray, Christian Aid

Ms. Hannah Stanton, Anti-Apartheid Movement (London Committee)

Ms. Margaret Stanton, Anti-Apartheid Movement (Chilterns Regional Committee)

Ms. Fannie Storr, United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel

Mr. Mike Terry, Anti-Apartheid Movement

Councillor Randolf Thompson, Wolverhampton Metropolitan Borough Council

Mr. Roy Trivedy, Labour Party

Ms. Gwenda Thompson, Presbyterian Chruch of Wales

Ms. Ingrid Uys, South Africa Foundation

Mr. Marc Wadsworth, Anti-Racist Alliance

Mr. Geoff Walker, Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers

Mr. Michael Walsh, Trade Union Congress

Councillor R. Ward, Wolverhampton Metropolitan Borough Council

Mr. Glenroy Watson, Anti-Apartheid Movement

Ms. Pauline Webb, Anti-Apartheid Movement

Ms. Cat Wiener, City of London Anti-Apartheid Group

Mr. Martin Wilkinson, Quaker Peace and Service

Rev. William Whiffen, Christian Ethical Investment Group

Ms. Jane Winder, One World Action

Mr. Dillon Woods, British Defence and Aid Fund

United States of America

Mr. Jim Cason, American Committee of Africa

VII. UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

A. Centre Against Apartheid

Mr. Johan Nordenfelt, Director

Ms. Corinne Momal

B. Department of Public Information

Ms. Marian Houk

Annex III

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

A. Reports

1. Second interim report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation

2. "South Africa: State of Fear", Amnesty International, 1992

3. "Agenda for Peace: An Independent Survey of the Violence in South Africa", the International Commission of Jurists, 1992

4. "South Africa's Police: From police State to democratic policing?", Catholic Institute for Internatinal Relations, 1992

5. "Blood on the tracks", Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, 1992

6. "Fortresses of Fear", Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, 1992

7. "Political Violence in South Africa", Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1992

B. Written submissions to the Hearing

1. "Transkei Government", input by Major General H. B. Holomisa, Chairman of the Transkei Military Council

2. "Political violence in South Africa: an overview of two years of destabilisation, July 1990 to June 1992", presented by Mr. Max Coleman, Human Rights Commission of South Africa

3. "Summary of peace initiatives in Natal by COSATU/UDF/ANC" and "Obstacles in the peace process in Natal", presented by Mr. Sipho Gabasche, Natal Regional Dispute Resolution Committee

4. "Hostels", presented by Mr. Chris Orr, Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression

5. "Violence on rail commuters", presented by Mr. Tefo Raditapole

6. Statement by Mr. Lebogang Motloung, special witness on attacks on rail commuters

7. Statement on efforts to end the political violence in South Africa by the Rev. Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches

C. Other documents

1. The National Peace Accord, September 1991

2. Memorandum to the Goldstone Commission, Lawyers for Human Rights, March 1992

3. Briefing on political assassinations in the 1990s, Human Rights Commission, May 1992

4. Evidence on the reef violence; tribal war or total strategy? presented by the Human Rights Commission and the Community Agency for Social Enquiry to the International Commission of Jurists, March 1992

5. Memorandum to the State President, South African Council of Churches, May 1992

6. Special briefing on massacres, Human Rights Commission, June 1992

7. "The human face of violence: hostels dwellers speak", Project for the Study of Violence, 1991

8. Memorandum on efforts to prevent the Boipatong massacre, lawyers representing the Vaal Council of Churches, June 1992

9. Statement read by Mr. Justice Goldstone at the Commission's Preliminary Hearing into the Boipatong massacre, 6 July 1992

10. Resolution on South Africa, Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, Dakar, June 1992